Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Frege on Apriority (with ps)' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16901 The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
16902 Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
16892 Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]