Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Content Preservation' and 'Philosophies of Mathematics'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
23890 For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
3060 Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
23891 Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
9955 Contextual definitions replace a complete sentence containing the expression [George/Velleman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
10031 Impredicative definitions quantify over the thing being defined [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
10098 The 'power set' of A is all the subsets of A [George/Velleman]
10099 The 'ordered pair' <a, b>, for two sets a and b, is the set {{a, b},{a}} [George/Velleman]
10101 Cartesian Product A x B: the set of all ordered pairs in which a∈A and b∈B [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
10103 Grouping by property is common in mathematics, usually using equivalence [George/Velleman]
10104 'Equivalence' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation; 'same first letter' partitions English words [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10096 Even the elements of sets in ZFC are sets, resting on the pure empty set [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
10097 Axiom of Extensionality: for all sets x and y, if x and y have the same elements then x = y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
10100 Axiom of Pairing: for all sets x and y, there is a set z containing just x and y [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
17900 The Axiom of Reducibility made impredicative definitions possible [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
10109 ZFC can prove that there is no set corresponding to the concept 'set' [George/Velleman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10108 As a reduction of arithmetic, set theory is not fully general, and so not logical [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
10111 Asserting Excluded Middle is a hallmark of realism about the natural world [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10129 A 'model' is a meaning-assignment which makes all the axioms true [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10105 Differences between isomorphic structures seem unimportant [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
10119 Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman]
10126 A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
10120 Soundness is a semantic property, unlike the purely syntactic property of consistency [George/Velleman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10127 A 'complete' theory contains either any sentence or its negation [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
10106 Rational numbers give answers to division problems with integers [George/Velleman]
10102 The integers are answers to subtraction problems involving natural numbers [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10107 Real numbers provide answers to square root problems [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
9946 Logicists say mathematics is applicable because it is totally general [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
10125 The classical mathematician believes the real numbers form an actual set [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
17899 Second-order induction is stronger as it covers all concepts, not just first-order definable ones [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10128 The Incompleteness proofs use arithmetic to talk about formal arithmetic [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
17902 A successor is the union of a set with its singleton [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
10133 Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10130 Set theory can prove the Peano Postulates [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
10089 Talk of 'abstract entities' is more a label for the problem than a solution to it [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10131 If mathematics is not about particulars, observing particulars must be irrelevant [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
10092 In the unramified theory of types, the types are objects, then sets of objects, sets of sets etc. [George/Velleman]
10094 The theory of types seems to rule out harmless sets as well as paradoxical ones. [George/Velleman]
10095 Type theory has only finitely many items at each level, which is a problem for mathematics [George/Velleman]
17901 Type theory prohibits (oddly) a set containing an individual and a set of individuals [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
10114 Bounded quantification is originally finitary, as conjunctions and disjunctions [George/Velleman]
10134 Much infinite mathematics can still be justified finitely [George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
10123 The intuitionists are the idealists of mathematics [George/Velleman]
10124 Gödel's First Theorem suggests there are truths which are independent of proof [George/Velleman]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14502 Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
3039 When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
17948 Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
20906 Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
556 If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
563 If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
565 The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
557 A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
9607 The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13263 We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
13261 Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
13265 Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
593 Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13260 Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11237 Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11238 Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
9382 Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17085 A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
1651 Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
10110 Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
3324 Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
7503 Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
2173 As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
9274 Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
94 Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
17947 Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
6015 Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
2912 Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
1526 Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]