Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Letters to the Lord Marquis of Newcastle' and 'Elements of Intuitionism (2nd ed)'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes]
Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]