Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theaetetus', 'Prerequisite to Dignity of Labour' and 'The Thought: a Logical Enquiry'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
A fact is a thought that is true [Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege]
Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett]
A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]