Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Reference and Necessity' and 'On Eternal and Immutable Morality'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
291 Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / c. Tabula rasa
6230 If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6228 Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
6229 Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
6227 Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
293 Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
6225 Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
6224 An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6223 If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth]
6226 The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth]