36 ideas
13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
18241 | Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |
18242 | Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |