169 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 192 | Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
| 21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
| 21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| 21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
| 21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
| 21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
| 21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| 21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
| 21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
| 21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
| 21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
| 21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
| 21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
| 9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
| 21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
| 21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
| 21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
| 21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
| 21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
| 21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
| 21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
| 21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
| 21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
| 21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
| 21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
| 21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
| 190 | If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato] |
| 21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| 21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
| 20184 | The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato] |
| 20185 | The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato] |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| 21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| 191 | Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato] |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| 21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| 21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
| 21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
| 18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 203 | Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato] |
| 202 | No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato] |
| 193 | Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato] |
| 197 | Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato] |
| 200 | People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato] |
| 188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
| 204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| 189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |