Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'talk' and 'Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
22519 Philosophers are revealed by their fears [Billington]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
17641 Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17638 If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
17632 Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17629 Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
17630 The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
17640 Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17627 It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17628 Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
17637 The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17639 Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
17631 Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
188 Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17633 The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]