100 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
2056 | Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
2086 | Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato] |
2083 | Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
2082 | A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato] |
2052 | Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato] |
15854 | A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
10216 | We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato] |
2060 | There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
2084 | If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato] |
15844 | A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato] |
15843 | The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
2080 | Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
16126 | Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato] |
2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
2076 | How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato] |
2045 | Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato] |
2067 | Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
2068 | With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato] |
2078 | You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato] |
2069 | Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
2089 | An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato] |
2085 | Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato] |
2091 | Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato] |
2087 | A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato] |
2090 | A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato] |
2081 | Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato] |
2088 | A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato] |
2047 | What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato] |
2053 | If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato] |
2059 | How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato] |
2054 | Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
2058 | God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato] |
2057 | There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato] |