Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Scientific Explanation' and 'Evidence'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9355 One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]