40 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
| 20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
| 20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
| 20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
| 20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
| 20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
| 20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
| 20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
| 20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
| 20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
| 20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
| 20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |