Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Nietzsche's Immoralism' and 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

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53 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]