31 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
| 19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
| 19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
| 19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
| 19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
| 19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
| 19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
| 19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
| 19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
| 19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
| 19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
| 19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
| 19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
| 19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |