68 ideas
1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
4465 | Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG] |
19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
4686 | Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG] |
7415 | Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG] |
7414 | What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG] |
6696 | The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG] |
19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
4687 | Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG] |
19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
6516 | Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG] |
11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
24054 | Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG] |
19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
3875 | If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG] |
5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
3876 | If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG] |
19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
7734 | Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG] |
7735 | Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG] |
19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
3877 | Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG] |
19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
6126 | Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG] |
3873 | An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG] |
3874 | How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG] |