20 ideas
291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |