14 ideas
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |
| 20696 | We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides] |
| 337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
| 336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
| 19085 | Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides] |