Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'The Moral Problem' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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45 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
13786 Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
13780 Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
13778 A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
13776 Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13777 A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
13790 A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
13791 Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
13789 Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
2063 How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13775 We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13787 Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
13774 Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13772 Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13788 If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
13792 There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
13781 Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
13785 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
13779 The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
13783 Even the gods love play [Plato]