Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy' and 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One truth leads us to another [Descartes]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes]
I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes]
When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]