Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)' and 'The Sentiment of Rationality'

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60 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
A single explanation must have a single point of view [James]
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James]