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All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'The Republic'

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209 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
Philosophers become as divine and orderly as possible, by studying divinity and order [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
The winds of the discussion should decide its destination [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein]
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein]
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
Dialectic is the only method of inquiry which uproots the things which it takes for granted [Plato]
The ability to take an overview is the distinguishing mark of a dialectician [Plato]
For Plato, rationality is a vision of and love of a cosmic rational order [Plato, by Taylor,C]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
You must never go against what you actually believe [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
People often merely practice eristic instead of dialectic, because they don't analyse the subject-matter [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein]
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
In mathematics certain things have to be accepted without further explanation [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein]
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein]
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry can lead the mind upwards to truth and philosophy [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / a. Defining numbers
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein]
A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We aim for elevated discussion of pure numbers, not attaching them to physical objects [Plato]
In pure numbers, all ones are equal, with no internal parts [Plato]
Geometry is not an activity, but the study of unchanging knowledge [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The same thing is both one and an unlimited number at the same time [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
To become rational, philosophers must rise from becoming into being [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Being depends on the Good, which is not itself being, but superior to being [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The best things (gods, healthy bodies, good souls) are least liable to change [Plato]
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Plato's reality has unchanging Parmenidean forms, and Heraclitean flux [Plato, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein]
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein]
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
The plurality of beautiful things must belong to a single class, because they have a single particular character [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space [Plato, by Aristotle]
Forms are not universals, as they don't cover every general term [Plato, by Annas]
Craftsmen making furniture refer to the form, but no one manufactures the form of furniture [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
A Form applies to a set of particular things with the same name [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Plato mistakenly thought forms were totally abstracted away from matter [Bacon on Plato]
Plato's Forms not only do not come from the senses, but they are beyond possibility of sensing [Plato, by Kant]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge must be of the permanent unchanging nature of things [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
If theory and practice conflict, the best part of the mind accepts theory, so the other part is of lower grade [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
Psychic conflict is clear if appetite is close to the body and reason fairly separate [Plato, by Modrak]
There is a third element to the mind - spirit - lying between reason and appetite [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The mind has parts, because we have inner conflicts [Plato]
The soul seems to have an infinity of parts [Aristotle on Plato]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein]
Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
The 'Republic' is a great work of rhetorical theory [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
For Plato and Aristotle there is no will; there is only rational desire for what is seen as good [Plato, by Frede,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
We avoid evil either through a natural aversion, or because we have acquired knowledge [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Without the surface decoration, poetry shows only appearances and nothing of what is real [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Representation is two steps removed from the truth [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
Artists should be excluded from a law-abiding community, because they destroy the rational mind [Plato]
Truth is closely related to proportion [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
I suggest that we forget about trying to define goodness itself for the time being [Plato]
Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Plato found that he could only enforce rational moral justification by creating an authoritarian society [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value [Nietzsche on Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
If something has a function then it has a state of being good [Plato]
A thing's function is what it alone can do, or what it does better than other things [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Goodness is mental health, badness is mental sickness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
If we were invisible, would the just man become like the unjust? [Plato]
Clever criminals do well at first, but not in the long run [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The main aim is to understand goodness, which gives everything its value and advantage [Plato]
Every person, and every activity, aims at the good [Plato]
Good has the same role in the world of knowledge as the sun has in the physical world [Plato]
The sight of goodness leads to all that is fine and true and right [Plato]
For Plato we abandon honour and pleasure once we see the Good [Plato, by Taylor,C]
Goodness makes truth and knowledge possible [Plato]
Bad is always destructive, where good preserves and benefits [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Pleasure is commonly thought to be the good, though the more ingenious prefer knowledge [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Philosophers are concerned with totally non-physical pleasures [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
There are three types of pleasure, for reason, for spirit and for appetite [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Pleasure-seekers desperately seek illusory satisfaction, like filling a leaky vessel [Plato]
Excessive pleasure deranges people, making the other virtues impossible [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Isn't it better to have a reputation for goodness than to actually be good? [Plato]
Morality is a compromise, showing restraint, to avoid suffering wrong without compensation [Plato]
Justice is merely the interests of the stronger party [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Surely you don't return a borrowed weapon to a mad friend? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Is right just the interests of the powerful? [Plato]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Sin first, then sacrifice to the gods from the proceeds [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
For Plato, virtue is its own reward [Lawson-Tancred on Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
True goodness requires mental unity and harmony [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
A good community necessarily has wisdom, courage, self-discipline and morality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Simonides said morality is helping one's friends and harming one's enemies [Plato]
If the parts of our soul do their correct work, we will be just people, and will act justly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
People need society because the individual has too many needs [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All exchanges in a community are for mutual benefit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
After a taste of mutual harm, men make a legal contract to avoid it [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
People doing their jobs properly is the fourth cardinal virtue for a city [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only rule by philosophers of integrity can keep a community healthy [Plato]
Reluctant rulers make a better and more unified administration [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Is there anything better for a community than to produce excellent people? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
To gain knowledge, turn away from the world of change, and focus on true goodness [Plato]
Dialectic is the highest and most important part of the curriculum [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Compulsory intellectual work never remains in the mind [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
If Plato's God is immaterial, he will lack consciousness, wisdom, pleasure and movement, which are essential to him [Cicero on Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
If the gods are non-existent or indifferent, why bother to deceive them? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Something is unlikely to be immortal if it is imperfectly made from diverse parts [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Is the supreme reward for virtue to be drunk for eternity? [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
God is responsible for the good things, but we must look elsewhere for the cause of the bad things [Plato]