Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Russell's Mathematical Logic' and 'From Supervenience to Superdupervenience'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
10041 Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21716 In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
10035 Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10042 Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
10038 A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10046 The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10039 Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10043 Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
10045 Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
16052 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T]
16053 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16056 Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16054 Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T]
16055 Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
16057 Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]