14 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
| 13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
| 13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
| 13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
| 13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
| 13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
| 13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |