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All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Essence and Modality' and 'German Philosophy 1760-1860'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
291 Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
22002 Wolff's version of Leibniz dominated mid-18th C German thought [Pinkard]
22021 Romantics explored beautiful subjectivity, and the re-enchantment of nature [Pinkard]
22010 The combination of Kant and the French Revolution was an excited focus for German philosophy [Pinkard]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
22036 In Hegel's time naturalism was called 'Spinozism' [Pinkard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
22048 Idealism is the link between reason and freedom [Pinkard]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
293 Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]