Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Gorgias', 'The Question of Realism' and 'Metaphysics: an introduction'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato]
We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato]
Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
All activity aims at the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato]
In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato]
If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato]
Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / b. Health
The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato]