36 ideas
| 291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
| 17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
| 19342 | Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz] |
| 17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
| 17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
| 17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
| 17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
| 17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
| 17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
| 17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
| 17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
| 17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
| 17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
| 17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
| 17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
| 17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
| 12711 | The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry] [Leibniz] |
| 19349 | The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes [Leibniz] |
| 7558 | Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint [Leibniz] |
| 16761 | Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics [Leibniz] |
| 13088 | Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates [Leibniz] |
| 17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
| 17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
| 17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
| 13085 | Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 5024 | Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc. [Leibniz] |
| 17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
| 17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
| 5027 | If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China [Leibniz] |
| 5023 | Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz] |
| 2119 | People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason [Leibniz] |
| 5025 | Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine [Leibniz] |
| 17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
| 5026 | Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection [Leibniz] |
| 293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |