17 ideas
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
295 | The good is beautiful [Plato] |
294 | People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |