Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'How Things Persist' and 'Course of Positive Philosophy'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley]
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley]