91 ideas
| 13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
| 13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 8251 | The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell] |
| 13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
| 13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
| 13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
| 13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
| 13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
| 19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
| 8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
| 13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
| 13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 8254 | Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell] |
| 13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
| 13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |