Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Letters to Leibniz 1' and 'Causality and Properties'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
I won't object if someone shows that gravity consistently arises from the action of matter [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]