Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laches', 'True in Theory, but not in Practice' and 'Letters to Burcher De Volder'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz]
Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz]
The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Only unities have any reality [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz]
In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz]
If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant]
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant]
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz]