13 ideas
291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |