Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Externalism/Internalism' and 'Principle of Life and Plastic Natures'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Maybe there is plain 'animal' knowledge, and clearly justified 'reflective' knowledge [Vahid]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Internalism in epistemology over-emphasises deliberation about beliefs [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
With a counterfactual account of the causal theory, we get knowledge as tracking or sensitive to truth [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalism makes the acquisition of knowledge too easy? [Vahid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]