Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)' and 'The Symposium'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


31 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato]
Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato]
Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato]
Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato]
Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato]
Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato]
The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato]