Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'On Sense and Reference' and 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey'

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81 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]