46 ideas
| 125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
| 1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
| 4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
| 21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
| 21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
| 116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
| 114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
| 135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
| 122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
| 139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
| 128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
| 4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
| 136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
| 134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
| 4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
| 132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
| 130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
| 21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
| 21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
| 21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
| 21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
| 120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
| 118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
| 131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
| 140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
| 119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
| 129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
| 4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
| 21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
| 137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
| 21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
| 21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
| 21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
| 141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
| 21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
| 123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
| 124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |
| 21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
| 21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
| 21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
| 21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
| 21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
| 21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
| 21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
| 21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
| 19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |