141 ideas
23890 | For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil] |
3060 | Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
23891 | Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
14502 | Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
20906 | Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle] |
3039 | When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius] |
17948 | Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas] |
556 | If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato] |
563 | If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato] |
557 | A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato] |
565 | The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato] |
9607 | The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
13263 | We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
13265 | Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki] |
13261 | Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
593 | Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
13260 | Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki] |
11237 | Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
11238 | Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
17085 | A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
1651 | Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
7503 | Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault] |
2173 | As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
9274 | Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray] |
94 | Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle] |
17947 | Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
6015 | Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut] |
2912 | Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
1526 | Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |