212 ideas
13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |