77 ideas
| 13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
| 13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
| 1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
| 1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
| 13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
| 13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
| 13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
| 13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
| 2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
| 19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
| 13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
| 1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
| 13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
| 13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
| 13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
| 10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
| 13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
| 12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
| 15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
| 9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
| 9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
| 1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
| 1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
| 19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
| 1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
| 9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
| 14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
| 7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
| 8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
| 17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
| 1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
| 13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
| 13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |