22 ideas
291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |