Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lysis', 'Dispositions and Powers' and 'An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation'

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is beautiful [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
People say that friendship exists only between good men [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]