Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86' and 'Causality and Properties'

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67 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]