Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Cratylus', 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)' and 'Intro to Gdel's Theorems'

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89 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
There cannot be a set theory which is complete [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order arithmetic can prove new sentences of first-order [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'partial function' maps only some elements to another set [Smith,P]
A 'total function' maps every element to one element in another set [Smith,P]
An argument is a 'fixed point' for a function if it is mapped back to itself [Smith,P]
The 'range' of a function is the set of elements in the output set created by the function [Smith,P]
Two functions are the same if they have the same extension [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
A 'theorem' of a theory is a sentence derived from the axioms using the proof system [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
A 'natural deduction system' has no axioms but many rules [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
No nice theory can define truth for its own language [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'injective' ('one-to-one') function creates a distinct output element from each original [Smith,P]
A 'surjective' ('onto') function creates every element of the output set [Smith,P]
A 'bijective' function has one-to-one correspondence in both directions [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
If everything that a theory proves is true, then it is 'sound' [Smith,P]
Soundness is true axioms and a truth-preserving proof system [Smith,P]
A theory is 'sound' iff every theorem is true (usually from true axioms and truth-preservation) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A theory is 'negation complete' if it proves all sentences or their negation [Smith,P]
'Complete' applies both to whole logics, and to theories within them [Smith,P]
A theory is 'negation complete' if one of its sentences or its negation can always be proved [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Two routes to Incompleteness: semantics of sound/expressible, or syntax of consistency/proof [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Effective' means simple, unintuitive, independent, controlled, dumb, and terminating [Smith,P]
A theory is 'decidable' if all of its sentences could be mechanically proved [Smith,P]
Any consistent, axiomatized, negation-complete formal theory is decidable [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A set is 'enumerable' is all of its elements can result from a natural number function [Smith,P]
A set is 'effectively enumerable' if a computer could eventually list every member [Smith,P]
A finite set of finitely specifiable objects is always effectively enumerable (e.g. primes) [Smith,P]
The set of ordered pairs of natural numbers <i,j> is effectively enumerable [Smith,P]
The thorems of a nice arithmetic can be enumerated, but not the truths (so they're diffferent) [Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
Being 'expressible' depends on language; being 'capture/represented' depends on axioms and proof system [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
For primes we write (x not= 1 ∧ ∀u∀v(u x v = x → (u = 1 ∨ v = 1))) [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
The reals contain the naturals, but the theory of reals doesn't contain the theory of naturals [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The truths of arithmetic are just true equations and their universally quantified versions [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The number of Fs is the 'successor' of the Gs if there is a single F that isn't G [Smith,P]
All numbers are related to zero by the ancestral of the successor relation [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / b. Baby arithmetic
Baby arithmetic covers addition and multiplication, but no general facts about numbers [Smith,P]
Baby Arithmetic is complete, but not very expressive [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / c. Robinson arithmetic
Robinson Arithmetic (Q) is not negation complete [Smith,P]
Robinson Arithmetic 'Q' has basic axioms, quantifiers and first-order logic [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Natural numbers have zero, unique successors, unending, no circling back, and no strays [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
The logic of arithmetic must quantify over properties of numbers to handle induction [Smith,P]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Multiplication only generates incompleteness if combined with addition and successor [Smith,P]
Incompleteness results in arithmetic from combining addition and successor with multiplication [Smith,P]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
The 'ancestral' of a relation is a new relation which creates a long chain of the original relation [Smith,P]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato]
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Even the gods love play [Plato]