Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Protagoras', 'Conditionals' and 'What is it like to be a bat?'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
192 Only one thing can be contrary to something [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
190 If asked whether justice itself is just or unjust, you would have to say that it is just [Plato]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20185 The most important things in life are wisdom and knowledge [Plato]
20184 The only real evil is loss of knowledge [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
191 Everything resembles everything else up to a point [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
203 Courage is knowing what should or shouldn't be feared [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
202 No one willingly and knowingly embraces evil [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
193 Some things are good even though they are not beneficial to men [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
197 Some pleasures are not good, and some pains are not evil [Plato]
200 People tend only to disapprove of pleasure if it leads to pain, or prevents future pleasure [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
188 Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato]
204 Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato]
189 If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato]