24 ideas
1922 | Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato] |
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
11259 | How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
20219 | True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato] |
5985 | Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato] |
5986 | The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
1923 | As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato] |
1919 | You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato] |
4894 | I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson] |
4895 | Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson] |
4886 | Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
1918 | How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato] |
1916 | Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |