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All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Negation' and 'works'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]