70 ideas
291 | Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato] |
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
293 | Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato] |
23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |