Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Meno', 'Conditionals' and 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
1922 Spiritual qualities only become advantageous with the growth of wisdom [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
11259 How can you seek knowledge of something if you don't know it? [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
13768 Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
13770 There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13764 Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
13765 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20219 True opinions only become really valuable when they are tied down by reasons [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
5985 Seeking and learning are just recollection [Plato]
5986 The slave boy learns geometry from questioning, not teaching, so it is recollection [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
1923 As a guide to action, true opinion is as good as knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
1919 You don't need to learn what you know, and how do you seek for what you don't know? [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
1913 Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato]
1921 If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato]
1927 It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
1918 How can you know part of virtue without knowing the whole? [Plato]
1916 Even if virtues are many and various, they must have something in common to make them virtues [Plato]