Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Laches', 'Causal Relations' and 'Utilitarianism and the Virtues'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Don't assume that wisdom is the automatic consequence of old age [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Being unafraid (perhaps through ignorance) and being brave are two different things [Plato]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]