52 ideas
13786 | Wisdom is called 'beautiful', because it performs fine works [Plato] |
13780 | Good people are no different from wise ones [Plato] |
13778 | A dialectician is someone who knows how to ask and to answer questions [Plato] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
13776 | Truths say of what is that it is, falsehoods say of what is that it is not [Plato] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
13790 | A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato] |
13777 | A name is a sort of tool [Plato] |
13791 | Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato] |
13789 | Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
2063 | How can beauty have identity if it changes? [Plato] |
13775 | We only succeed in cutting if we use appropriate tools, not if we approach it randomly [Plato] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
13787 | Doesn't each thing have an essence, just as it has other qualities? [Plato] |
16640 | Form is the principle that connects a thing's constitution (rather than being operative) [Hill,N] |
13774 | Things don't have every attribute, and essence isn't private, so each thing has an essence [Plato] |
13772 | Is the being or essence of each thing private to each person? [Plato] |
13788 | If we made a perfect duplicate of Cratylus, there would be two Cratyluses [Plato] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
13792 | There can't be any knowledge if things are constantly changing [Plato] |
13781 | Soul causes the body to live, and gives it power to breathe and to be revitalized [Plato] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
13785 | 'Arete' signifies lack of complexity and a free-flowing soul [Plato] |
13779 | The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato] |
13783 | Even the gods love play [Plato] |