Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Truth and Predication' and 'Review of Chihara 'Struct. Accnt of Maths''

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
For Plato true wisdom is supernatural [Plato, by Weil]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Plato never mentions Democritus, and wished to burn his books [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Two contradictories force us to find a relation which will correlate them [Plato, by Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess]
There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess]
Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess]
How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Plato's idea of 'structure' tends to be mathematically expressed [Plato, by Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Platonists argue for the indivisible triangle-in-itself [Plato, by Aristotle]
When Diogenes said he could only see objects but not their forms, Plato said it was because he had eyes but no intellect [Plato, by Diog. Laertius]
Plato's Forms meant that the sophists only taught the appearance of wisdom and virtue [Plato, by Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If there is one Form for both the Form and its participants, they must have something in common [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
If gods are like men, they are just eternal men; similarly, Forms must differ from particulars [Aristotle on Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
A Form is a cause of things only in the way that white mixed with white is a cause [Aristotle on Plato]
The Forms cannot be changeless if they are in changing things [Aristotle on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The greatest discovery in human thought is Plato's discovery of abstract objects [Brown,JR on Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can grasp whole things in science, because they have a mathematics and a teleology [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Plato sees an object's structure as expressible in mathematics [Plato, by Koslicki]
Plato was less concerned than Aristotle with the source of unity in a complex object [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Plato's holds that there are three substances: Forms, mathematical entities, and perceptible bodies [Plato, by Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Plato and Aristotle take essence to make a thing what it is [Plato, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
A good explanation totally rules out the opposite explanation (so Forms are required) [Plato, by Ruben]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Plato never refers to examining the conscience [Plato, by Foucault]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
As religion and convention collapsed, Plato sought morals not just in knowledge, but in the soul [Williams,B on Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Plato's legacy to European thought was the Good, the Beautiful and the True [Plato, by Gray]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Plato, unusually, said that theoretical and practical wisdom are inseparable [Plato, by Kraut]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Plato is boring [Nietzsche on Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Almost everyone except Plato thinks that time could not have been generated [Plato, by Aristotle]